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CEPS, with financial assistance of the Finnish SITRA Foundation, embarked at the end of
2000 on a programme to examine the impact of Justice and Home Affairs  acquis on an
enlarged European Union, the implications for the candidate countries and for the states with
which they share borders. The aim of this programme is to help establish a better balance
between civil liberties and security in an enlarged Europe.
This project will lead to a series of policy recommendations that will promote cooperation in
EU JHA in the context of an enlarged Europe as well as institutional developments for the
medium- to long-term in areas such as a European Public Prosecutors Office, re-shaping
Europol and a developed system of policing the external frontier (Euro Border Guard). These
must be made within a balanced framework. There are two key issues:
  First of all, to prevent the distortion of the agenda by “events” – some items are being
accelerated and other marginalised. This risks upsetting the balance, carefully crafted by the
Finnish Presidency, between freedom, security and justice. The current ‘threat’ is that security
issues, at the expense of the others, will predominate after the catastrophic events of 11th
September. These have resulted in a formidable political shock, which served as a catalyst to
promote certain initiatives on the political agenda, such as the European arrest warrant, and a
common definition of terrorism. The monitoring of items, which could be marginalised and
the nature of the institutional/political blockages that could distort the Tampere agenda, is our
priority.
  Secondly, how to look beyond the  Tampere agenda, both in terms of providing a flexible
approach during the period of completion of the Tampere programme as well as what should
come afterwards. Much detail remains to be filled in about rigid items on the Tampere agenda
and CEPS will continue to work in three very important areas:
•  Arrangements for managing and policing the external frontier
•  Judicial co-operation leading to the development of a European Public Prosecutor
•  Strengthening of  Europol, particularly in the field of serious trans-frontier violence and
moves towards a more federalised policing capacity
The CEPS-SITRA  programme brings together a multi-disciplinary network of 20 experts
drawn from EU member states, applicant countries as well as  neighbouring states: the
European University Institute in Florence, the Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw), European
Academy of Law (ERA  Trier), Academy of Sciences (Moscow), London School of
Economics, International Office of Migration (Helsinki), Fondation  Nationale des Sciences
Politiques (CERI) in France, Universities of Budapest, Université Catholique de Louvain-la-
Neuve, University of Lisbon ( Autonoma), University of  Nijmegen, University of Burgos,
CEIFO in Stockholm, University of  Tilberg and University of Vilnius, as well as members
with practical judicial and legislative backgrounds.1
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Introduction
The subject of this paper is undoubtedly of paramount importance for a number of Central
and East European countries. The image of a “Schengen Fortress” in statu nascendi is
disappointing even for those who are enthusiastic about the accession of their countries to a
unified Europe. There is a widespread fear – rational or not – that cross-border human
contacts and travel possibilities from East to West will become more difficult than they were
in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The same feeling can be detected even in the
Balkans, where certain countries also show symptoms of the “Schengen Fortress”.
How to define the Balkans?
Instead of entering into semantic and geopolitical debates, let me use – only for the purposes
of the present report – a simple list of the following countries: Romania, Slovenia, Croatia,
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia (F.Y.R.O.M.), Albania
and Bulgaria.
This list makes it possible for me to avoid the rather dubious task of defining the “Balkans”.
Moreover, from the point of view of the Schengen problematic, the real issue is in fact to
name those countries that are seriously concerned by the common visa policy of the Schengen
countries including, inter alia, Greece, which is also geographically situated on the Balkan
Peninsula.
Visa-free countries and countries under visa-obligation: reasons and imperfections of
the distinction
The crucial issue of the future of free trans-border movement depends largely on whether a
country belongs or not to the group of countries whose nationals can enter the territory of the
Schengen countries without a visa. One of the basic “achievements” of the Schengen
cooperation is that there is now a common list of “visa-free” and “visa-obligated” countries
(even if some minor exceptions exist).
Which are the countries whose nationals are exempted from the obligation of obtaining a
common Schengen visa before entering the territory of a member of the Schengen co-
operation?
The answer can be found in the Council Regulation N°539/2001, 15 March 2001. According
to this document, the following countries of the sub-region should be considered as being in a
visa-free relationship with the European Union: Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia, whereas
nationals from Romania (temporarily), Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia still need
a visa to enter the Schengen area.
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The position of Romania is ambiguous: the country is in fact mentioned on the list of the visa-
free countries, but the date of entry into force of this provision concerning Romania “shall be
decided subsequently by the Council … on the basis of the report … [based on] undertakings
…on illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of persons …”. A first
report was presented in the summer 2000. Politically, this means a real advantage for Bulgaria
and a definite encouragement for Romania, both figuring on the visa “black list” in the
previous document N°574/1999, adopted on 12 March 1999
1.
How are these lists of countries made up?
The motivations can be read in regulation N°539/2001: § 5. “The determination of those third
countries whose nationals are subject to the visa requirement, and those exempt from it, is
governed by a considered, case-by-case assessment of a variety of criteria relating inter alia to
illegal immigration, public policy and security, and to the European Union’s external relations
with third countries, consideration also being given to the implications of regional coherence
and reciprocity.”
2
It striking to notice that this explanation no longer contains the criteria listed in a previous
draft
3, which, besides making reference to the relative ease of falsification of travel
documents, the validity of contracted re-admission agreements and information about national
police and immigration policies, made a very controversial allusion on the alleged
relationship between certain types of crimes and nationals of certain countries. As a matter of
fact, the actual definition itself also leaves room for manoeuvre that leads to a quasi total
discretion to the European Union (or more precisely the Schengen countries), mixing political
and legal considerations, facts, expectations and acts of encouragement.
How to satisfy the common visa criteria? Which countries satisfy it?
In reality it is not so much the existence of a visa-obligation in itself that is felt problematic
but rather the fact that the material as well as procedural conditions of granting visas could
hamper the economic and cultural relations between individuals of two neighbouring, but
diverging countries, with respect to the visa-regime. Another disappointment is due to the fear
that a foreigner may always be perceived as a “potential (illegal) immigrant”, as Schengen
cooperation emphasises the will to fight against illegal immigration. This aspect is clearly
highlighted in a number of documents.  The Common Manual and Common Consular
Instructions
4 stipulates, for instance, that the main issues to be borne in mind when examining
visa applications are:
… the security of the contracting Parties and the fight against illegal immigration as
well as other aspects relating to international relations. Depending on the country
concerned, one of these may take precedence over the other, but at no stage should any
of them be forgotten.
                                                
1 Council Regulation (EC) N°574/1999 of 12 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals
must be in possession of visas when crossing external borders.
2 Council Regulation (EC) N°539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals
must be in possession of visas when crossing external borders and those whose nationals are exempt
from that requirement.
3 500PC0027 document of the Commission, issued 28 February 2000.
4 Decision of the Executive Committee of April 28 1999 on the definitive versions of the Common
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The purpose of examining applications is to detect those applicants who are seeking to
immigrate to the territory of the Contracting Parties and set themselves up there, while
entering on grounds such as tourism, studies, business or family visits, as a pretext.
Therefore, it is necessary to be particularly vigilant when dealing with “risk categories”
in other words unemployed persons, and those with no regular income.
Furthermore, this aspect has been reinforced by the perception that the common criteria, as
established on the experts’ and decision makers’ tables, will hardly be able to take into
consideration the realities in the poorer parts of the world and especially the infrastructural
gap between the developed parts of Europe and some Balkan countries.
The question could be reformulated as follows: Can an average person from Central
and Eastern Europe satisfy the Schengen entrance criteria?
In order to answer to that question, a look at the common Schengen visa criteria seems
necessary.
The recently amended  Common Manual and Common Consular Instructions, mentioned
above, enumerates the following visa criteria:
The applicant
a) should have a valid travel document,
b) must not be on the ‘alert list’ or pose any risk to security or international relations,
c) should present, “where necessary”, documents supporting the purpose and the
conditions of the planned visit,
c) should have guarantees of means of return and means of subsistence.
As the Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions stipulates, the supporting
documents shall cover the purpose of the journey, the means of transport and return, the
means of subsistence and accommodation. The first one could be in particular, a letter of
invitation, a summons or an organised trip and the second could be, a return ticket or currency
for petrol or car insurance. As proof of subsistence, the following means can be presented:
liquid cash in convertible currency, travellers cheques, cheque books for a foreign currency
account, credit cards or any other means that guarantee funds in hard currency, all being
proportionate to the length and purpose of the visit and to the cost of living in the Schengen
states. As supporting documents regarding accommodation, a hotel reservation, a lease or a
property title can be required. If the alien is hosted by a national, a priori checking (personal
identity, address, family ties etc.) or the issuing of certificates or the presentation of public
documents could be required. Other documents can also be asked for, relating, inter alia, the
proof of ties with the country of residence or the proof of the social and professional status of
the applicant.
The applicant’s good faith should also be checked by the consular officer: In order to do so,
“the mission or post shall check whether the applicant is recognised as a person of good faith
within the framework of local consular cooperation. Checks shall [however] be reduced where
the applicant is known to be a bona fide person” or, in case of groups, if “a reputable and
trustworthy body is able to vouch for the good faith”.
On the whole, the administrative officer’s discretion is therefore quite large. However, the
Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions emphasises its concern about
eventual deep links between inhabitants and officers: “In order to avoid ‘habits’ being formedPÉTER KOVÁCS
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which could lead to a decline in the level of vigilance, the officers responsible shall be rotated
on a regular basis.”
Can nationals from the visa-obligated countries of the Balkans satisfy these conditions?
Even if these conditions can be met in the abstract, it is highly possible that some social strata,
for example, farmers, may not be in possession of credit cards, cheque books etc. The
inadequate conversion rate of home currency, the weak financial background of some small,
local savings banks and insurance companies or the under-financed character of certain
professions, the high rate of unemployment, (due to, amongst others, damages caused by
war), could also hinder the agreement of the visa officer to deliver a visa.
On the other hand, the nature and the depth of the information needed for the deliberation on
visa applications shall imply a very deep control of the private sphere of the individual, that
could bring to mind Orwell’s vision “Big Brother”. Citizens of Romania will discover with
astonishment the reappearance of some types of control of their contacts with foreigners that
they already knew under the Ceausescu era.
The intrusion into the private sphere required by the Schengen system should not only be
analysed per se, but also from the point of view the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, adopted at the Nice Summit of December 2000, which Article 8 stipulates:
Article 8: Protection of personal data
1. Every person has the right to protection of personal data concerning himself or
herself
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been recorded concerning him
or her and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent
authority.
Is there a complete coherence between this article and the Schengen rules on collecting
information for a visa decision?
The list of alert of persona non grata is an instrument in use in most countries. As a symbol
of European solidarity and as an instrumental tool of the Schengen cooperation, the territorial
validity of being  non grata is extended to whole Schengen territory. This has a hard
consequence for third country nationals. If there should be no discussion on the legitimacy
and usefulness of such geographical extension for serious crimes, the same effect should not
be applied to petty administrative infractions. Otherwise, one could hardly understand the
proper implementation of the right proclaimed in Article 49 § 3 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights: “The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.”
Flexibility in the application of the Schengen system and its eventual impact on the
concerned Balkan countries
Despite of the apparent rigidity of the list of countries, certain elasticity can be detected in the
system of the Schengen cooperation. Even the dichotomy of visa-free and visa-obligated
countries can admit ex lege that certain territories enjoying a special status within the stateTHE SCHENGEN CHALLENGE AND ITS BALKAN DIMENSIONS
5
have a specific regime, which can either be beneficial or detrimental. The list of these entities
can be found in the Council Regulation (EC) N°539/2001
5.
According to this document, even if China is on the list of countries under visa-obligation,
inhabitants of Hong Kong and Macao special administrative units reserve the right to enter
without any visa. Inhabitants of the Palestinian Authority (many of them are not only
refugees, but de jure Israeli citizens, as Palestine has never been proclaimed or recognised as
an independent state, certainly not by Schengen countries) are under visa-obligation, whereas
Israeli passports are visa-free.
This example shows that despite of the  a priori mandatory distinction between visa-free
countries and countries under visa-obligation and despite the principle of the prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality implying the impossibility of any distinction between
nationals of the same state, the Schengen regime knows certain derogations from this rule.
The introduction of Limited Territorial Validity (LTV) visas makes it possible for a state to
grant a permit of entry to someone not fulfilling the criteria of the common Schengen visa if
this state considers it important to allow his presence for humanitarian or national political
considerations. In this case, however, that person is not entitled to enter another Schengen
country. National visas (visas for long or national visits – NV) are issued for longer validity
than three months with the same geographic restriction and their conditions are regulated by
the states in their sovereign capacity. (The 1990 Schengen Convention recognised in Article
14 the possibility of passports whose validity would only concern a part of the national
territory. However, the Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions stipulate
“limited territorial validity may not apply to a territory smaller than that of a contracting
party.”)
The Common Manual and the Common Consular Instruction lists the special passports whose
holders can have access into the issuing country and transit access into other Schengen
countries without any visa. For instance, the Greek green-coloured “alien's identity card”
issued by Greek authorities to third country nationals but of Greek origin, and the beige-
coloured “special identity card for persons of Greek origin”: this document is issued to
Albanian nationals of Greek origin and is valid for three years. This card is also issued to
spouses and descendants of Greek origin, regardless of nationality, provided there is official
documentation of some kind to prove their family ties. Another example is the French
practice to issue a special residence certificate only to Algerians.
It is not by chance that some candidate countries to the European Union are also thinking of
the establishment or the recognition of analogous preferential ties with their national
minorities living in neighbouring countries.
Special Problems for Peoples of Balkan Countries
The importance of family and linguistic factors cannot be underestimated in the foreign
travels of nationals of Balkan countries. An important part of their journeys abroad concerns a
neighbouring country either because of small purchases or for the promotion of family ties.
Due to the fact that Schengen is definitely heading East, its procedures will not only be an
obstacle to tourism but also, and especially, to the legitimate will of trans-border contacts
coloured by ethnic or linguistic affiliations. This is the reason why Schengen is of greater
                                                
5 Council Regulation (EC) N°539/2001 of March 15 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals
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importance for the Balkan countries than their relationship and travel opportunities to the
actual Schengen members. Therefore, the sooner the circle of participating countries is
enlarged, the better. Furthermore, this will be the only way to ensure a real Schengen border
with the neighbouring states.
The progressive adaptation of the Schengen principles by candidate countries will soon have
an impact on the contacts that the Hungarian minority in Romania, Ukraine and Yugoslavia
have with Hungary; similarly for the Croatian minority in Yugoslavia, the German and Slovak
minority in Romania and so on.
This problem deserves more attention than one would think at first glance. It should also be
kept in mind that both minority-related Conventions of the Council of Europe contain
pertinent dispositions
6 on this matter and bilateral treaties are often even more explicit in this
field.
It is certainly true that Schengen documents and  inter alia, the Common Manual and the
Common Consular Instructions refer to “family ties”, “local situations” and so on, which can
be considered as a theoretical basis for a more elastic implementation of the common
principles. However, if Schengen decision-makers do not pay deserved attention to the
problem, minority issues may implicate a number of tensions between countries and within
the countries themselves. Furthermore, it can also emerge as conflict of norms and a challenge
to the principle pacta sunt servanda.
The amount of the fee for the visa and the required minimum sum of hard currency were
calculated on the basis of fees and subsistence minima
7 in the Schengen countries. The rigid
application of the method of calculation will mean that the entry into the Hungarian territory
for instance will be quasi-impossible not only for unemployed persons but also for teachers,
nurses, physicians, pensioners amongst others.
The institution of Limited Territorial Visas cannot provide an adequate solution to this
problem, as the text of the Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions stipulates
“LTVs are issued by way of exception. The conditions under which this type of visa is issued
shall be carefully examined on a case-by-case basis”. The Schengen Contracting Parties will
                                                
6 Framework-convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Europe:
“Art. 17(1): The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to national
minorities to establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts across frontiers with persons lawfully
staying in other states, in particular those with whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or
religious identity, or a common cultural heritage.”
“Art. 18(2): Where relevant, the Parties shall take measures to encourage trans-frontier co-operation.”
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages:
“Art.14: trans-frontier exchanges
The Parties undertake:
a) to apply existing bilateral and multilateral agreements which bind them with the states in which the
same language is used in identical or similar form, or if necessary, to seek to conclude agreements, in
such a way as to foster contacts between users of the same language in the states concerned in the
fields of culture, education, information, vocational training and permanent education;
b) for the benefit of regional or minority languages, to facilitate and/or promote co-operation across
borders, in particular between regional or local authorities in whose territory the same language is used
in identical or similar form.”
7 According to the  Common Manual and the Common Consular  Instructions, the possessed daily
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therefore hardly use and abuse the possibility to issue LTVs, as this would not be in line with
the principles and objectives of Schengen. Given that the number of LTVs being issued will
most probably be small, it would be difficult to envisage an automated procedure for
informing the other Contracting Parties
8.
Conclusion
From the point of view of the effects of Schengen on citizens, Balkans countries can be
divided into two groups.
Apparently, the Schengen cooperation has no negative effect – either at present or in the
future – on the circulation of citizens of Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria because they are on
the list of the countries whose nationals can stay in all Schengen countries for three months
without any visa.
However, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania and Albania are countries
whose nationals are and will be concerned in a negative way. Even if Romania’s performance
was credited by the Commission in the report adopted at the end of June 2001, the Council
has not yet approved the Commission’s proposal on the definite characterisation of Romania
as a visa-free country.  Nevertheless, as it was shown above, Greece lobbied successfully in
order to preserve the preferential destination of Albanian citizens of Greek origin: they can
enter without major problems in Greece.
All these issues explain the intensity of brainstorming and legislative activities  in a number
of future and potential Schengen countries in order to maintain as much as possible the
present levels of contacts with neighbouring countries, often with a special, but not exclusive
regard to kin-nationals, in order to avoid the a mechanic extension of the existing Schengen
rules, that would have a negative effect on human contacts as well as on bilateral relationships
of neighbouring countries if only one of them is a full member of the Schengen cooperation.
Moreover, Schengen cooperation may also  challenge the proper implementation of
conventions on minority protection of the Council of Europe. Thus it is high time  to
incorporate an adequate corresponding mechanism into the Schengen documents.
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